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Critical energy policy decisions rely on expert assessments of key future uncertainties. But existing
modelling techniques that help form these expert assessments often ignore the existence of uncertainty.
Consequently, techniques to measure these uncertainties are of increasing importance. We use one
technique, expert elicitation, to assess six key uncertain parameters with 25 UK energy experts across
academia, government and industry. We obtain qualitative descriptions of the uncertain parameters and
a novel data set of probability distributions describing individual expert beliefs. We conduct a sensitivity
analysis on weights for a linear opinion pool and show that aggregated median beliefs in 2030 are: for oil
price $120/barrel (90% CI: 51, 272); for greenhouse gas price $34/tCO2e (90% CI: 5, 256) and for levelised
cost of low-carbon electricity 17.1 US cents/kWh (90% CI: 8.3, 31.0). The quantitative results could inform
model validation, help benchmark policy makers’ beliefs or provide probabilistic inputs to models.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Investment and policy decisions made now have a substantial
effect upon the composition of the future energy system due to the
long lifetimes of energy plant and infrastructure and the conse-
quent effects of path dependency and technology lock-in. Con-
versely, the current beliefs of decision makers regarding the value
of key future parameters effect the decisions they make today. For
example, Strachan et al. (2008) and Usher and Strachan (2012)
have shown that energy transition pathways are sensitive to a
range of uncertainties. Clearly, while it would be useful to have
perfect knowledge regarding the future so that one could make
perfect decisions, an approach which takes into account the range
of possible future values is more realistic. Such decision theoretic
approaches that allow a full range of possible futures to informublished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
r the terms of the Creative
tricted use, distribution, and
thor and source are credited.
tp://www.ucl.ac.uk/energycurrent decisions readily exist, such as stochastic programming
(Keppo and Zwaan, 2011), real-options (Siddiqui et al., 2007) and
uncertainty analysis (Morgan et al., 1992). However, while empiri-
cal data sources exist for the values of some key uncertainties,
such as forward markets for oil (which could reﬂect traders'
collective beliefs about the future oil price), for other important
uncertainties there exist no sources of data. Furthermore, just as
caution is required when extrapolating ﬁndings from a sample to a
population, statistical data about the past is not necessarily
indicative of the future. So, even when empirical data does exist,
it may not be suitable for decision support. In such cases, a formal
expert elicitation can provide quantiﬁed subjective beliefs for
parameters with no alternative data sources.
To provide evidence for decision makers in the energy ﬁeld,
computer models are commonly used to support and codify expert
knowledge of the integrated energy and climate change system
(Rotmans and van Asselt, 2001b). In the process of constructing
models, researchers make judgements about the structure of these
models, the selection of parameters and the values of inputs.
Commonly, the inputs to one model are derived from outputs of
other models. For example, Integrated Assessment Models use
formulae that emulate the relationships between energy technol-
ogies, the macro-economy and GHG emissions (Rotmans and vanreserved.
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tainties for these model inputs only if such data exists, or if they
have the speciﬁc expertise to make sound scientiﬁc judgements as
to the range and likelihood that represent these uncertainties.
Consequently, the knowledge obtained from the outputs of models
is inherently conditional on the assumptions made by the mod-
eller (Stirling, 2010).
We propose that expert elicitation is an improvement upon the
current situation. Firstly, an expert elicitation is a formal process
that can produce high quality, traceable, transparent and explicitly
subjective data on parameters for which there is no empirical
alternative. Secondly, data from an expert elicitation can displace
existing informal approaches to gathering data for uncertain
parameters in models.
We claim that the formal approach provided through expert
elicitation can enhance the policy making process through
improved transparency and through the provision of more repre-
sentative data.1 We offer caution here, because there is potential
for misuse and because there are some troubling aspects of the
elicitation approach that undermine the beneﬁts unless handled
correctly. One important aspect is that expert elicitation does not
provide an objective data set de jure, but the subjective beliefs of
individual or a group of experts. Thus decisions based on this data
are explicitly linked to the subjective beliefs held within the data.
The integrity of the subsequent decisions rely both on the accuracy
of the expert's beliefs and that of the process by which those
beliefs were quantiﬁed. However, the former is the inherent
nature of relying upon subjective judgements to make decisions,
be they explicit or implicit and encoded within a model. Expert
elicitation is rightly concerned with minimising the error in the
latter through accounting for the inﬂuence of bias and heuristics
upon an expert's judgement.
This work captures a snapshot of the beliefs of 25 UK energy
experts in late 2011 about the value of six key uncertain para-
meters in 2030. We collected data on both the range of plausible
values and the associated likelihoods for each parameter, through
a formal one-to-one interview process. This study shows how
expert elicitation can be used to produce data for use in energy-
economic modelling. These results show the subjective beliefs of
UK energy experts for parameters of national and international
importance. The resulting probability distributions are of interest
to a wide range of international and national stakeholders includ-
ing those in academia, decision makers in the public and private
sectors, governments and investors. The included data set can be
used both to verify and validate existing scenario studies, to
benchmark policy maker's beliefs or to inform model inputs.
1.1. Literature review
Bayesian probability theory stipulates that subjective beliefs
about a well deﬁned parameter can be described using a prob-
ability distribution (De Finetti, 1974). Expert elicitation is the
process by which expert beliefs are encoded (Garthwaite et al.,
2005) using methods that mitigate the detrimental effects of
heuristics and biases (Kahneman et al., 1982).
O'Hagan (2006) provides a review of a number of heuristics and
biases, ﬁrst explored by Kahneman et al. (1982). Heuristics are
tools or shortcuts used by individuals to replace reasoned decision
making. Bias is a systemic distortion introduced into data through
an unaccounted factor. Key biases and heuristics include anchoring
and adjusting—respondents to not adjust their judgement sufﬁ-
ciently from an anchor value; availability bias—ideas that come
more easily to mind are deemed more probable than those1 i.e. representative of the actual beliefs of experts.difﬁcult to recall; representativeness—respondents are incoherent
in their probability assessment (probabilities do not sum to one).
Elicitation methodologies received considerable attention
between the 60s and 80s, predominantly at the junction of
statistics and psychology. As such, there are a wide selection of
methodologies from which to choose. Potential candidates include
the ﬁxed and variable interval methods for direct elicitation of
continuous parameters. Alternatively, the elicitation can focus on
statistical summaries of parameters, such as mean and variance.
However, individuals are often poor estimators of statistical
summaries, and the elicitation of intervals gives better results
(see Garthwaite et al., 2005, for a detailed discussion).
Expert elicitation has been used in energy and climate policy to
derive quantitative probabilistic judgements on key climate vari-
ables and their impact on climate sensitivity from sixteen USA-
based climate experts (Morgan and Keith, 1995). There have been a
range of subsequent elicitation studies on climate change impacts
and adaptation uncertainties (Zickfeld et al., 2007; Granger
Morgan et al., 2001; Hagerman et al., 2010). In terms of mitigation
and energy pathway uncertainties, there have been fewer formal
elicitation studies. Indeed these have largely been limited to
assessments of individual key technologies (Baker et al., 2010;
Baker and Keisler, 2011; Bosetti et al., 2012; Zubaryeva et al., 2012)
and single policy measures (Baker et al., 2009), exploring the
relationship between research and development funding and
technological learning. Also, elicitation has been used to obtain
data on uncertain input parameters, for which there is no other
data source, such as the permeability of rock beneath proposed
nuclear waste repositories (Bonano et al., 1990; O'Hagan, 1998).
When data is unlikely to be readily forthcoming, for example
through analysis of forward market prices, a formal elicitation
process forms one of the only ways in which the subjective beliefs
of experts can be captured.
1.2. Layout
We ﬁrst discuss the selection of parameters and experts and
how we conducted one-to-one interviews with 25 energy experts
from academia, government and industry to elicit uncertainties for
six parameters that inﬂuence decision making in the energy
sector. We then present results for ﬁve of the six parameters,
and show the implications of two different approaches to pooling
beliefs using expert beliefs for oil price in 2030 as a case study.
We conclude with implications for policy makers and energy
modellers, and suggestions for further work.2. Methods
2.1. Selection of uncertain parameters
The selection of the six uncertain parameters (see Table 1)
explored in this paper followed experience of modelling uncer-
tainty in the energy system (Usher and Strachan, 2010, 2012) and
interaction with policy makers. We selected a range of interna-
tional and national drivers of energy demand including those
parameters to which the structure of the future energy system is
most sensitive. The parameters chosen are important drivers of
energy demand, energy system structure, or energy system cost.
Population is a strong scaling factor of energy demand, as is the
change in GDP or relative afﬂuence (Rosa and Dietz, 2012).
Behavioural aspects of energy, such as the temperature to which
individual homes are heated are important when multiplied over a
population (Beugin and Jaccard, 2011). Prices of GHG and oil result
in very different technology pathways in energy system modelling
studies (Usher and Strachan, 2012). Consequently, expectations of
Table 1
Selected uncertain parameters.
Key input Units
UK population in 2030a Million
Average annual change in UK GDP 2010–2030b Average annual % change
International GHG price in 2030c (2010) $/tCO2e
Long-term oil price in 2030c (2010) $/barrel
Average levelised cost of UK low carbon electricity system in 2030b (2010) US cents/kWh
Average main room temperature during heating season in UK domestic dwellingsa 1C
a National parameter.
b National parameter, but indicative of international situation.
c International parameter.
Table 2
Expert afﬁliation.
Expert afﬁliation Experts contacted Experts interviewed
Academia 26 16
Industry 5 5
Government 6 4
Total 37 25
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sions today. The levelised cost of electricity inﬂuence investment
in different portfolios of technologies.
Following a trial elicitation conducted with staff researchers in
the UCL Energy Institute, we determined that it was difﬁcult to
elicit more than six to eight univariate distributions per two hour
interview. We therefore restricted the project to just six uncer-
tainties. The trial elicitation also enabled us to establish a con-
sistent interview structure and identify problematic wording in
the deﬁnition of uncertain variables. For example, we ﬁrst asked
for an absolute value for UK GDP in 2030, but quickly found that
participants thought more easily in terms of annual percentage
change. This question was amended for the actual elicitation.
2.2. Selection of experts
We contacted 37 experts across industry, academia and govern-
ment in the UK. Of these, 25 responded positively to a request for
interview (Table 2). Although the proportion of experts from each
sector is uneven, which may inﬂuence the ﬁndings, there is no
indication from the results that afﬁliation is a signiﬁcant explanatory
factor. Even so, sample sizes are small, so we are not able to claim
that we have captured a representative sample of all UK energy
experts (as far as that would be possible). Clemen and Winkler
(1999) note that there are decreasing marginal returns to adding
experts and recommend using between three and ﬁve due to the
trade-off between time required and results. Furthermore, experts
similar in modelling style, philosophy and access to data tend to
provide redundant information, and so heterogeneity is a preferential
feature of the sample of experts. It is difﬁcult to judge heterogeneity
before making the interviews, and so we interviewed as many
individuals as possible, particularly so as to provide even coverage
across all the parameters. We collected data regarding experts’ access
to data for each parameter (see Table 3), as well as their research
style, such as interpretation of secondary data, modelling from ﬁrst
principles. This data is used to weight the expert judgements, the
results of which can be found in Section 4.
2.3. Overview of the elicitation process
We interviewed experts individually in sessions lasting one to
two hours. The interviews consisted of an introduction, brieftraining in uncertainty, probability and the expert elicitation
process followed by the actual elicitation. A script was used to
ensure consistency between interviews.
We adopted a variable interval approach assessing the median
and quartiles (also known as the bisection approach), where the
following series of questions were asked:
“Please could you give your lowest plausible bound for x, where
you would be happy assigning a very low (as close to 0 as
possible) probability that the value could be lower than this”.
“Please could you give your highest plausible bound for x,
where you would be happy assigning a very low (as close to
0 as possible) probability that the value could be higher
than this”.
“Please could you give your median estimate for x, where you
consider it equally likely that the value could be above or below
your median?”
“Please could you give me your lower quartile for x, where you
consider it equally likely that the value could be above or below
your lower quartile?”
“Please could you give me your upper quartile for x, where you
consider it equally likely that the value could be above or below
your upper quartile?”
The order of questions within each parameter elicitation was
structured so as to avoid the inclusion of biases and heuristics into
the process. For example, by ﬁrst asking for an upper and lower
plausible bound, the interviewee is anchored equally to both
ends of the range when thinking about their median belief. The
advantage of this approach is that only judgements of equal-
likelihood are required. Individuals tend to be quite good at
assessing probabilities using variable intervals, although there is
a tendency for over-conﬁdence. However over-conﬁdence can be
mediated to some extent through a calibration process. We there-
fore integrated a calibration step into the training stage, giving
feedback to respondents regarding their performance in the practice
elicitation.
While eliciting the quartiles, the participant was shown a visual
representation of their upper and lower bounds when choosing
the median, the lower bound and median when choosing the
lower quartile and median and upper bound when choosing their
upper quartile. The interviewee was then shown a plot of the
equally likely values represented by their summaries, where each
of four ranges is assigned a probability of 25%. In some cases, if the
interviewee was not happy with the values shown, the summaries
were again elicited or adjusted, following the order above. Once
happy with the elicited values, the interviewee was guided by the
facilitator to choose one of six distributions. These include either a
normal, scaled beta, student-T, log normal, log student-T or
gamma distribution. Distributions were initially ﬁtted to the
Table 3
Data sources used by experts during elicitation.
ID Afﬁliation Pop GDP GHG Oil Elec Temp Notes
1 Acad. T T T T TPA IHM, IHR
2 Acad. IHM T, IHM IEA MM Carb
3 Ind. UN IHM IHM, IEA, DEM IHM A (IHM)
4 Ind. A OBS CPF A IHM, MM GHG bi-modal
5 Ind. T Scenarios Carb GHG bi-modal
6 Acad. ONS, SRES SRES IHM IHM IHM
7 Acad. ONS, IHM, OPP
8 Acad. ONS, oms IHR IHR GOD, IHR IHM, IHR IHR
9 Ind. ONS ONS IHM (EU) IEA IHM A, T
10 Acad. ONS ONS, T CPF DEM TPA A
11 Acad. A A A MM A
12 Acad. ONS, IHR IHR, OMR IHM DEM T
13 Acad. ONS, T FS IHR GOD, IHR IHM IHR
14 Acad. ONS, FS T, ONS DECC IHR IHR T
15 Acad. ONS, UKERC IHR IHR T
16 Acad. T NR NR NR NR IHR
17 Gov. ONS IHM IHM DEM T
18 Acad. IHM IHM DEM IHM A
19 Gov. ONS, GAD HMT E, T DEM, IEA MM, IHM IHR, IHM
20 Gov. ONS, IHM, OBR IHM IHR, DEM, IEA NR IHM
21 Gov. ONS, T OBR, HMT, T IHR, A IEA, T, IHR A, MM A
22 Ind. ONS T IHM, IHR BP, DEM, IHM
23 Acad. A A, T T BP, GOD E A
24 Acad. ONS WB, ONS DCPF, NG, MM, CE IEA, DEM, EAI MM, oms, PB E
25 Acad. IHR, A T IHR T MM, DECC A
A – anecdotal evidence, Carb – CARB heat project, CE – Cambridge econometrics, CPF – carbon price ﬂoor, DCPF – DECC carbon price forecasts, DEM – DECC energy model
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010), E – empirical data, EIA – Energy Information Administration (USA), FS – foresight scenarios, GAD – Government Actuaries
Department, GOD – Sorrell et al. (2010), IEA – international energy agency, IHM – in-house modelling, IHR – in-house research (non-modelling), IPCC – international panel on
climate change, MM – Mott MacDonald (2010), NG – national grid, NR – nonresponse, OBR – ofﬁce of budget responsibility, oms – other modelling studies, ONS – ofﬁce of
national statistics, OPP – ofﬁce of population projections, PB – PB power, SRES – Nakićenović and Swart (2000), T – knowledge of historical trends, TPA – Greenacre et al.
(2010), UN – United Nations (population projections), WB – World Bank.
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squares. After assessing, amending or conﬁrming the ﬁtted
distribution, the interview progressed to the next uncertain
parameter. During the interview, experts were encouraged to
discuss the reasoning behind their beliefs, declare any interests
they may have that could inﬂuence their answers, give a summary
of their relevant expertise and a list of key evidence to which they
referred. This process was repeated for each of the six parameters.
Finally, feedback was provided to each expert for each parameter
after ﬁtting the ﬁnal distribution.
To assist the elicitation we used the SHELF 2.0 software (Oakley
and O'Hagan, 2010) a package for the R open-source statistical
package (R Development Core Team, 2011) and saved the data in a
Microsoft Access database.
2.4. Assessing the expert judgements
Elicitation is an inherently imprecise process. Even experts are
unlikely to represent their beliefs exactly using the process of
eliciting summaries, so we were careful to adopt a method that
integrated validation of experts' claims and the method itself
throughout the project.
Firstly, we assessed the degree to which the expert is calibrated,
that is whether they are under- or over- conﬁdent (their distribu-
tions are too narrow or too wide) using a practice elicitation trivia
question at the beginning of the interview:
“What is the length of the Moscow Underground Network
in km?”
An energy expert's uncertainty for this practice elicitation is
epistemic, i.e. related to their lack of knowledge about the true
value of the length of the Moscow underground. The uncertainty
surrounding a future parameter is also epistemic, although unlikethe practice question, unknowable at the present time. The results
give an indication of expert performance, and an experts con-
ﬁdence can be checked by comparing the probability distribution
they offer as a representation of their belief, with the true answer
(known in this case to be 301.2 km).
Secondly, at the beginning of the interview we provided
training on biases, heuristics and probability, as well as eliciting
summaries in such a way as to avoid introducing further biases
and use of heuristics. We provided two forms of feedback to the
expert; equally probable ranges implied by the elicited summaries,
and the distribution that best ﬁt the elicited summaries.
Finally, we collected qualitative data from the experts during
the interview on the data to which they referred when thinking
about the uncertainty. This can be used as a proxy for determining
correlation between experts. Table 3 shows the sources of data
declared by experts. For example, expert 1 is an academic,
knowledgable of the historical trends for GHG price, oil price
and so on, but conducted in-house research and modelling for the
average main room temperature. In contrast, expect 9 is in the
industrial sector, conducts modelling in GHG price and for leve-
lised cost of electricity, and draws upon ONS projections for
population and GDP. The sharing of data sources indicates that
for some parameters, the beliefs of the experts could be strongly
correlated. For example 15 of the 25 experts cite the ONS
population projections for the population parameter, while 5 of
the 25 conduct in-house research or modelling on population or
demographics. We address the consequences of this in the
discussion section, through weighted aggregation techniques.
2.5. Aggregation of expert beliefs
The aggregation of expert beliefs can take two forms, either
behavioural aggregation or mathematical aggregation. Behavioural
aggregation requires the interview of a group of experts and
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dynamics. O'Hagan (2006) recommends behavioural aggregation,
and prefer to elicit expert judgements in small groups. In this
study, due to organisational constraints, we interviewed experts
individually and therefore mathematical aggregation is the only
method available to us. There are a number of mathematical
aggregation techniques, some of which are reviewed in Cooke
(1991). A larger review (Clemen and Winkler, 1999), concludes
that a simple average, or linear pool, is often the best performing
aggregation method, as it is less sensitive to the input assumptions
than some of the more powerful Bayesian aggregation techniques
such as that suggested in Morris (1977). While an equally
weighted linear pool (i.e. average) is simple, several rather strong
assumptions are implicit in the process, chieﬂy that the experts'
beliefs are independent of one another and that experts are
equally expert. It is likely that experts draw upon similar data
sources (experts are correlated), or perhaps are anchored to a
particular value (experts are biased). If we correct for these, we are
likely to arrive at a more precise description of the collective
beliefs of the experts.
We recognise that mathematical aggregation can be controver-
sial. For example Stirling (2010) remarks that representing the
diversity of opinion is invaluable if the aim is to inform policy,
while others entirely reject the rationale for aggregation (Keith,
1996), claiming that it is impossible to correctly rationalise the
fundamentally different mental models experts have for describ-
ing complex systems. Morgan et al. (1992) note that checking the
sensitivity of a particular aggregation technique should be part of
the selection process.
While taking the above concerns into account, we have
followed the guidance in Clemen and Winkler (1999) and
O'Hagan (2006) and use a simple weighted linear pool to represent
the aggregated expert belief, shown in Eq. (1),
pðθÞ ¼ ∑
n
i ¼ 1
wipiðθÞ ð1Þ
wheren is the number of experts
piðθÞ represents i's probabilities for unknown θ
pðθÞ represents the combined probability distribution
wi signiﬁes the weights assigned to experts to reﬂect the
combination of expert bias, correlation or expertiseAs described later in Section 4.1, we carefully assessed the
sensitivity of the linear pool to the weights applied to experts, and
determined that our ﬁndings are robust to changes in whether
experts are weighted according to their(i) judgement of probabilities and
(ii) selection of data sources, or
(iii) both.3. Results
We present results for following international and national
parameters; the UK population in 2030, average growth in UK GDP
between 2010 and 2030, oil price in 2030, GHG price in 2030 and
levelised cost of low-carbon electricity in 2030. Due to the
dominance of anecdotal evidence referred to by the experts for
average main room temperature in 2030, we have excluded the
results from this study. All prices are deﬂated to US$2010.3.1. UK population in 2030
Fig. 1(a) shows the range of expert beliefs for UK population in
2030. The experts stated that the key determinants of UK popula-
tion in 2030 are birth rate, death rate, and net migration. Each of
these factors are related to one or other of the uncertain para-
meters included in this study as well as with a complex web of
other uncertainties. For example, birth rates typically decrease as
GDP increases, depending on the overall development phase
within which the country sits. Birth rate often increases with
positive net migration, the subjects of whom are often of a
younger, working and family raising age. Net migration depends
upon the relative economic prosperity of the UK compared to
other countries to which its borders are open, while border
permeability is dependent on country policy. The current Con-
servative Government has a low-migration policy, limiting the
entrance of non-EU migrants to the UK, but this will have limited
effect on the ﬂow of EU citizens, especially if Turkey were to join
the EU. Death rate is declining, and the population is ageing, a
result of increasing improvements in health, again correlated with
positive GDP growth. A number of respondents declared that the
natural components of population, birth and death rate, are
relatively certain while the quantity of net migration is more
uncertain; the signiﬁcantly uncertain component of the latter
being the UK Government sentiment and policy towards immigra-
tion. A few respondents mentioned that high impact but improb-
able events could have a signiﬁcant positive or negative effect
on UK population such as the migratory effects of climate change
(i.e. an inﬂux of refugees), or a signiﬁcant disaster such as nuclear
meltdown or war.
When discussing population, most experts referred to historical
trends and the population forecasts published by Ofﬁce of National
Statistics. These forecasts are developed by the Ofﬁce of Population
Projections, a source mentioned by just one respondent. Just three
interviewees (2, 7 and 18) maintained some form of population or
demographic model. Most experts were therefore users of fore-
casts developed by one central Government source.
UK population reached 62 million in 2010, having grown from
57 million in 1990. All median expert beliefs show that UK
population will continue to grow out to 2030, although the ranges
given by many of the experts cover the possibility of a contraction
in population.
3.2. Average annual change in UK GDP: 2010–2030
The expert beliefs of UK GDP were less consistently similar than
those of population and the dynamics are arguably more complex.
Beliefs coalesced around the principle of the UK in global markets,
with recession and recovery a signiﬁcant determinant of growth
over the next two decades. Even if the UK were able to radically
restructure its economy to become a market leader in new
technologies and services, it is likely that a global recession would
signiﬁcantly dampen GDP growth. There were some suggestions
that UK could play a leading role in low carbon technologies, and a
few experts emphasised the existing strength of the UK's ﬁnancial
sector. Across the range of possibilities expressed, the lower end
(near-zero) growth could only be possible in the case of a very
weak recovery following a lengthy and drawn out recession.
Fig. 1(b) shows the range of expert beliefs for the average
annual growth in UK GDP between 2010 and 2030. Most respon-
dents were strongly anchored to the historical average of 2%,
despite detailed discussions that considered the ongoing economic
crisis, and the potentially deleterious effect this may have over the
next two decades. Experts 4, 6 and 23 gave very pessimistic
forecasts, with a median belief less than 1% average annual growth
between 2010 and 2030. No expert interviewed believed that
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Fig. 1. (a) shows UK population in 2030, (b) shows average annual change in UK GDP: 2010–2030, (c) shows Levelised cost of low-carbon electricity in 2030 and (d) shows
long-term price of oil in 2030.
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those interviewed practised some form of modelling capability.
3.3. Levelised cost of low-carbon electricity in 2030
Experts identiﬁed a limited portfolio of low-carbon technolo-
gies each of which they believed capable of achieving a 20% share
of the UK electricity market (in energy rather than capacity terms),
given build, infrastructure and other constraints. However, the mix
of technologies identiﬁed changed substantially across the range
of costs. The technologies identiﬁed included: on-shore and off-
shore wind, nuclear and gas or coal with carbon capture and
storage (CCS). One individual mentioned that solar could techni-
cally contribute this quantity of electricity in the UK. Many experts
were sceptical of CCS, noting that while the technology has
great promise, it is still unproven on a commercial scale. Many
experts indicated that the range of costs depended on a function of
(i) the mix of technologies employed which in turn depended on
the domestic policy support extended to renewable generation in
the interim decades to 2030; (ii) the degree to which cost
reductions occur for the identiﬁed technologies due to domestic
and international learning effects, correlated with the likelihood of
a global deal; (iii) the effect of the Fukushima disaster upon the
nuclear sector, speciﬁcally the public perception of nuclear safety;
(iv) the ability of the UK to successfully deploy nuclear power atthe required scale; and (v) the technical success or failure of any
one or group of the low-carbon technologies. High costs were
associated with a number of scenarios, ranging from perverse
policies that subsidise expensive low-carbon technologies that
do not undergo learning cost-reductions, to a failure of any one
of CCS, nuclear or wind. Low costs were generally technically
optimistic, associated with international cooperation, large scale
roll out of low-carbon technologies, targeted policies delivering
renewable generation at least-cost, coupled with large expansion
of nuclear. Opinions on nuclear were divided across experts.
These ranged from the pessimistic—the true costs of nuclear are
unknown, to the optimistic—wide scale roll-out will result in
least-cost electricity. However, most experts were cognisant of
the limited time in which there is to build nuclear power stations
and as such, the optimism was moderated by acknowledgement
of the mix of technologies likely to comprise the 2030 electricity
system.
Fig. 1(c) shows the range of expert beliefs for the cost of low-
carbon electricity in 2030. Median estimates ranged between
8.8 and 25.3 US cents/kWh, with a much larger range of estimates
for upper and lower quartiles of 6.9–37.3 US cents/kWh. These
costs are largely similar to estimates of the levelised cost of
generating electricity in Heptonstall (2007). The majority of experts
interviewed conducted independent modelling or research into the
levelised cost of low-carbon electricity.
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Fig. 2. Shows price of GHG credits available to the UK in 2030.
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The discussion of oil prices focused on the classic dynamics of
supply and demand and the role of substitution for alternative
energy carriers due to concern surrounding the environment or
energy security. Supply focused on geopolitics, the technical
availability of oil and at what price, the marginal price of extrac-
tion, the degree to which exploration would remain ﬁnancially
viable given alternative competing fuels and advances in extrac-
tion technology. Dramatically increasing demand, particularly
from transition economies and the potential for lock-in to Western
style consumption patterns (e.g. very large road construction
projects in China), could counter increasing pressure to reduce
oil consumption in the more economically developed regions such
as Europe, due to concerns surrounding energy security and
climate change. The substitution of alternative fuels for oil pro-
vides an upper limit on the long-term oil price, given the
increasing range of technologies available, but this is also depen-
dent on the support for the development of these technologies in
the periods up to 2030, thus critical dependency on mid-term
environmental or energy security policies. As oil prices are
determined on the global market, increases in the long-term oil
price are likely to be correlated with positive global economic
growth and therefore positive UK GDP growth. However, an
increase in GHG prices may suppress demand for oil in participat-
ing countries which could in turn depress the global price of oil.
Fig. 1(d) shows the range of expert beliefs for the long-term
price of oil in 2030
Compared to the 20 year period between 1990 and 2010, when
oil prices rose to reach an historic high of $100/barrel, the pooled
beliefs show an expectation that oil prices will increase yet further.
The pooled beliefs indicate that there is a 90% likelihood of the oil
price in 2030 lying between $51/barrel and $270/barrel, with just a
25% likelihood of the price falling below $88/barrel.3.5. Price of GHG credits available to the UK in 2030
Of the uncertain parameters discussed in the interviews, GHG
price provoked the most diverse range of beliefs from experts. A
key driver was determined to be ‘political will’, the determination
of politicians, and by extension civilians, to affect change. The
majority of experts declared their hope for a carbon price by 2030,
with an agnostic minority. However, the majority of respondents
expressed pessimistic beliefs relative to their hopes. The major
dependent parent uncertainty was the likelihood of achieving a
global deal. Political will is loosely inversely correlated with global
GDP growth, with many respondents declaring that a prolonged
recession would be likely to distract citizens and policy makers
from environmental concerns. As such, a number of experts (e.g.
4 and 5) identiﬁed the distribution for their beliefs of price of GHG
credits to be bimodal. Thus, if political will were strong enough to
secure a deal, the carbon price would be greater than 0=tCO2e.
While our software was not able to explicitly represent a bimodal
distribution, we separately elicited the non-zero part of the
elicitation. Most experts also noted that the UK ambition would
likely falter in the absence of a global deal, and thus the carbon
price would fall to 0=tCO2e. One individual noted that if the UK
was isolated internationally yet continued with an ambitious
policy, it would be exposed to extremely high GHG prices due to
the need for entirely domestic mitigation measures.
Fig. 2 shows the cost of GHG credits available to the UK in 2030.
The majority of median beliefs are below 160=tCO2e and only two
experts give a 25% likelihood to the value being greater than
150=tCO2e.4. Discussion
While the spread of beliefs represented by the elicited dis-
tributions across the cohort of experts is interesting in their
diversity, an individual distribution that represents the collective
belief of all the experts is more practical to incorporate into the
decision making process.4.1. Pooling expert judgements
We explore the implications of imposing a linear opinion pool
on the expert judgements for long-term oil price in 2030. Fig. 3
shows two iterations of the linear opinion pool, as described by
Eq. (1). In the unweighted pool all experts are treated as indepen-
dent and no compensation is made for bias or correlation. In the
weighted pool, weights are assigned to experts based on combina-
tion of expert bias and correlations between experts due to
shared data.
Weights were assigned to experts corresponding to their
performance in the practice elicitation (a proxy for bias), with
higher weights assigned to those whose interquartile range
enclosed the actual value, medium weights assigned to those
whose 90% conﬁdence interval enclosed the actual value, and
lowest weights assigned to those for whom the actual value was
outside their 90% conﬁdence interval. We experimented with
different ranges of ratios of weights, e.g. from 1:10:100 to 1:2:3
(low:medium:high). Weightings were also adjusted according to
the correlation of expert data sources. The effect of data correla-
tion is that if the value expressed in the data source were to
change, all correlated experts would update their beliefs in the
same direction. It follows that correlated beliefs should be given
less weight than independent beliefs.
Each combination of the weightings resulted in only very small
changes to the shape of the pooled distribution, and negligible
movement in the median. The correlation weighting has a very
small effect on the linear pool for oil, due to the fact that the most
correlated individuals are close the median of the sample. A lower
weighting for these experts results in a slightly ﬂatter distribution,
thus the pool slightly under-estimates the degree of uncertainty
surrounding future oil price, but again, the median remains
relatively close to the value given above.
W. Usher, N. Strachan / Energy Policy 61 (2013) 811–821818Both the weighted and unweighted linear opinion pools give a
median oil price of $120/barrel (90% CI: 51, 272) for 2030. Our
results agree with Clemen and Winkler (1999), results from the
linear pool are insensitive to the input assumptions.Table 4
Summary of linear pooled beliefs for uncertainties in 2030.
Parameter 5th perc. Lower
quartile
Median Upper
quartile
95th perc.
Pop (millions) 60.80 65.20 68.00 71.20 76.90
GDP (av. ann. %) 0.59 1.43 1.86 2.30 2.96
Elec (US cents/kWh) 8.32 13.98 17.12 21.28 31.04
Oil ($/barrel) 51.50 88.10 120.00 161.00 272.00
GHG ($/tCO2e) 4.83 19.40 33.90 109.00 256.00
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Fig. 3. The weighted and un-weighted linear opinion pool for oil price, and a kernel
density estimate showing historical oil prices, all inﬂated to 2010$.
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given an increase in the independent parameter.Given the relative insensitivity of the linear pool to expert
weighting, we now present a summary of unweighted linear
pooled beliefs for each of the parameters in Table 4.
For UK population, the pooled 90% conﬁdence interval gives a
range between 60.8 and 76.9 million, with a median belief of 68.0
million. This median value represents an average annual increase
of around 0.5%, which is somewhat lower than the historical
average annual increase of almost 1% between 1990 and 2010.
Fig. 3 shows a kernel density estimate with the distribution of
(real) oil prices between 1990 and 2010, compared with the
pooled results from the elicitation. The results show a median
expectation (equal odds) that average oil price will be $120 in
2030, signiﬁcantly higher than historical prices.
Pooled beliefs for GHG prices are such that the median value
will be $34/tCO2e, which is very low compared with that needed
to maintain an average global surface temperature of 2 1C or
below, according to existing modelling studies (e.g. Edenhofer
et al., 2006, 2010; Hanson and Laitner, 2006; Vaillancourt et al.,
2008; Weyant et al., 2006).
4.2. The uncertain parameters in a wider context
In the introduction, we described the use of models as a means
to understand and describe the complex energy-economic system,
and the importance of beliefs about the future for decisions made
today. The interviews provoked the experts to describe the
complex relationships between those uncertain variables for
which we elicited distributions, and those for which we did not.
Each expert therefore described their ‘mental model’ for each
parameter. It quickly became clear that the structure of uncertain-
ties are highly dependent, in that the values for, and indeed
uncertainties surrounding, each parameter are dependent on one
another. The sketch in Fig. 4 collates this information from the
expert interviews. The signs in Fig. 4 indicate the direction of
change inﬂuenced by the independent (parent) variable on the
dependent (child) variable. Dependence follows the direction of
the arrows. The consensus achieved regarding the ‘mental models’
held by experts for the structure of the uncertain parameters isExtraction
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y the experts. The + or  sign shows the relative effect on the dependent parameter
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results.
We did not attempt to elicit distributions to represent the
dependencies between the parameters—indeed, we elicited uni-
variate distributions only. The elicited distributions therefore
represent a ‘package’ of dependent beliefs. The practice of eliciting
bi- or multi-variate uncertainties or the covariances of the inter-
twined network of uncertain parameters, although possible, is
complicated and time consuming. An alternative to eliciting joint
distributions to provide a multivariate description of parameters is
to structure the questions in such a way to avoid conditional
dependence (O'Hagan, 2006). For example, structuring the elicita-
tion so that ‘UK GDP in 2030’ is expressed as ‘per capita GDP in
2030’ would result in a much weaker dependency on population.
Thus decomposition of uncertain parameters is recommended for
future studies, but this approach was unsuitable for this paper,
given our resource constraints and the broad scope. The results
offer guidance to future work, for example the experts describe
the logical components for decomposing their beliefs of UK
population—birth rate, death rate, net migration.5. Concluding remarks
While our approach to the problem of uncertainty is inﬂuenced
by our background in energy system modelling, the problem of
treating uncertainty is common to all studies of long-term energy
transitions. We have shown that it is possible to quantify key
uncertainties that fall outside the models for which expert elicita-
tion is normally used. By careful deﬁnition of the uncertain
parameters and interview approach, experts can communicate
their mental models for the structure of the uncertainties (i.e. the
relationships between parameters) as well as quantify the value of
the uncertainties themselves. We found that while experts agreed
on the structure of the uncertain parameters, the shape of the
distributions representing their beliefs showed wide variation,
reﬂecting the differing perspectives of the interviewees. Decom-
posing the structure of the parameters and exploring the inﬂuence
of dependence on expert responses may help explain some of
these differences. However, the pooled beliefs are insensitive to
the weighting assumptions that compensate for bias and correla-
tions within and between experts. This implies that the pooled
median values in Table 4 are a robust representation of the beliefs
of those experts interviewed, given our choice of a linear pool.
As decision makers seek to make strategic decisions on energy
investments that account for uncertainty, obtaining probabilistic
data to support these decisions will require increasingly sophisti-
cated techniques. Obtaining probabilistic inputs is hindered by
constraints on both supply and demand—a lack of data and the
prevalence of deterministic models, especially in the ﬁeld of
energy modelling, that use expected values where probability
distributions would be more appropriate. Expert elicitation is an
effective technique to obtain values of uncertain parameters for
which it is otherwise difﬁcult or expensive to obtain data.
The quantitative results of this expert elicitation have a range of
applications across the energy modelling community in academia,
government and industry. Firstly expert elicitation could inform
model validation (across various types of models), and the data set
included in Appendix A can be used for input and output
parameter validation. Secondly expert elicitation can help bench-
mark policy makers’ beliefs and form a structured comparison
across decision makers differentiated by country, income, political
viewpoint, age or other criteria. Finally expert elicitation as
described in this paper can provide probabilistic inputs to models;
an especially important application as modellers now have greater
software capacity to describe models probabilistically than underlyingknowledge of what probability distributions to employ. Future work
will conduct a systematic review and comparison of high-proﬁle
energy models with the results of an expert elicitation process.
In this paper, we have applied a method that can enable a
transparent debate on uncertain parameters of key importance to
a wide range of stakeholders involved in energy decisions. But, in
the longer term, we recommend using expert elicitation with
other uncertainty methods, such as the propagation of uncertain-
ties through models, formal scenario analysis and sensitivity and
uncertainty analysis.Acknowledgements
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Appendix A. Data set
Note all distributions designated ‘beta’ in the data ﬁle are in
fact scaled beta f βðxÞ, calculated using the following formula,
where a closed interval, the upper and lower bound, ½x0; x1 is
speciﬁed:
f βðxjα; β; x0; x1Þ ¼ f½ðxx0Þ=ðx1x0Þα1
½ðx1xÞ=ðx1x0Þβ1=½Bðα; βÞðx1x0Þ
where Bðα; βÞ is the beta function.
Expert Param Dist Lo Up A B
1 Pop Beta 60 70 2.74 2.09
2 Pop Gamma 63.5 65.5 17100 0.003787879
3 Pop Gamma 60 69 778 0.084745763
4 Pop Lognorm 65 74 4.24 0.0425
5 Pop Norm 64 72 67.2 2.2
6 Pop Norm 45 75 62.8 8.05
7 Pop Lognorm 66 76 4.25 0.0317
8 Pop Beta 62.3 70 1.23 2.04
9 Pop Norm 62.3 77 70 2.92
10 Pop Gamma 62.3 85 196 0.37037037
11 Pop Beta 62 70 1.92 1.42
12 Pop Beta 65 75 1.56 1.57
13 Pop Beta 55 80 1.37 1.18
14 Pop Lognorm 70 80 4.3 0.0429
15 Pop Lognorm 0 85 4.23 0.0553
17 Pop Beta 60 100 0.892 1.92
18 Pop Gamma 55 93 52.7 1.338688086
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20 Pop Beta 60 78 2.07 1.39
21 Pop Norm 0 90 70.1 7.32
22 Pop Beta 62 75 1.24 0.997
23 Pop Lognorm 62.3 70 4.18 0.0308
24 Pop Normal 65 73 69 1.51
25 Pop Gamma 64 75 989 0.068493151
1 GDP Norm 1.4 1.9 1.65 0.144
2 GDP Norm 1.25 2.25 1.75 0.31
3 GDP Norm 1.2 3.2 2.31 0.556
4 GDP Beta 0.5 3.5 3.61 4.43
5 GDP Norm 0.85 3.2 2.02 0.643
6 GDP Norm 1 3 1 1.08
7 GDP Norm 0.8 2.5 1.6 0.295
8 GDP Beta 0.3 3 3.09 1.73
9 GDP Norm 0.5 3.5 2 0.71
10 GDP Norm 0.5 3.25 1.99 0.693
11 GDP Beta 1 3.5 1.36 2.01
12 GDP Norm 0.6 3.5 2 0.709
13 GDP Norm 1 3.5 2.18 0.562
14 GDP Norm 1.75 2.75 2.25 0.271
15 GDP Beta 3 4 7.19 3.12
17 GDP Beta 0.5 4 1.22 1.33
18 GDP Beta 0 4 3.76 3.76
19 GDP Norm 1.5 3 2.1 0.288
20 GDP Beta 1.5 2.7 2.17 2.09
21 GDP Lognorm 0 5 0.667 0.584
22 GDP Norm 1 2 1.5 0.264
23 GDP Gamma 0.1 2.5 3.86 0.27173913
24 GDP Norm 1 3 2.17 0.371
25 GDP Gamma 0.5 3 5.27 0.292397661
1 GHG Beta 15 100 1.21 2.46
2 GHG Lognorm 25 80 3.7 0.292
3 GHG Gamma 0 120 0.775 57.47126437
4 GHG Gamma 13.5 100 4.6 10.8577633
5 GHG Lognorm 0 300 4.23 0.929
6 GHG Gamma 2 200 1.35 50.50505051
7 GHG Lognorm 20 60 3.46 0.289
8 GHG Lognorm 0 275 4.28 0.451
9 GHG Beta 0 100 0.555 1.21
10 GHG Beta 10 200 3.32 9.41
11 GHG Lognorm 20 100 3.72 0.455
12 GHG Beta 0 80 0.63 1.53
13 GHG Gamma 0 100 2.65 17.48251748
14 GHG Lognorm 0 1000 3.92 1.78
15 GHG Beta 0 200 1.6 12.4
17 GHG Beta 5 250 0.525 1.32
18 GHG Norm 15 80 47.5 23.9
19 GHG Lognorm 10 300 3.97 0.846
20 GHG Gamma 0 70 3.1 10.89324619
21 GHG Gamma 0 1000 0.872 248.7562189
22 GHG Beta 15 30 1.1 0.759
23 GHG Lognorm 0 200 4.35 0.585
24 GHG Norm 50 80 64.4 8.36
25 GHG Lognorm 0 100 3.11 0.764
1 Oil Lognorm 100 200 5 0.185
2 Oil Gamma 50 175 15.3 7.575757576
3 Oil Gamma 40 250 3.48 39.5256917
4 Oil Lognorm 30 100 4.29 0.223
5 Oil Lognorm 25 300 4.77 0.695
6 Oil Gamma 40 300 4.79 32.78688525
7 Oil Lognorm 100 180 4.89 0.173
8 Oil Beta 60 200 2.65 1.35
9 Oil Beta 15 250 1.43 1.79
10 Oil Beta 25 200 1.44 1.57
11 Oil Beta 80 130 1.16 1.6212 Oil Beta 100 700 1.31 1.43
13 Oil Beta 10 250 1.53 1.48
14 Oil Gamma 60 130 18.1 5.102040816
15 Oil Gamma 10 500 2.17 67.56756757
16 Oil Gamma 40 250 4 34.12969283
17 Oil Beta 20 400 3.76 10.1
18 Oil norm 80 200 140 22.2
19 Oil lognorm 20 500 5.03 0.651
20 Oil Beta 70 180 0.893 0.796
21 Oil Beta 25 400 1.78 2.39
22 Oil Lognorm 80 140 4.63 0.176
23 Oil Beta 15 180 2 1.4
24 Oil Gamma 75 100 258 0.326797386
25 Oil Gamma 30 200 6.18 19.53125
1 Elec Lognorm 7.5 15 2.33 0.212
2 Elec Gamma 8 16 29.1 0.420168067
3 Elec norm 6 12 9.68 1.83
4 Elec Lognorm 8 15 2.4 0.157
5 Elec Lognorm 7 13 2.25 0.187
6 Elec Lognorm 2.5 20 2.11 0.482
7 Elec Lognorm 9 15 2.41 0.144
8 Elec Beta 5 12 0.955 1.67
9 Elec Lognorm 5.5 17.5 2.25 0.328
10 Elec Gamma 6 20 13.2 0.980392157
11 Elec Beta 6.7 20 1.33 0.876
12 Elec Norm 6 25 15.4 4.44
13 Elec Gamma 3 15 7.53 1.342281879
14 Elec Beta 8 15 1.24 1.82
15 Elec Beta 4 50 1.2 4.5
16 Elec Beta 3 16.5 1.37 4.89
17 Elec Gamma 4 40 2.89 6.172839506
18 Elec Gamma 8 16 33.5 0.338983051
19 Elec Gamma 5 15 13.8 0.675675676
21 Elec Gamma 5 30 4.89 3.215434084
22 Elec Beta 9 15 1 1
23 Elec Gamma 5 20 6.82 1.623376623
24 Elec Normal 8.6 10.4 9.55 0.538
25 Elec Beta 5 20 1.72 0.869
1 Temp Norm 19 21.5 20.3 0.775
2 Temp Lognorm 20.5 21.5 3.04 0.0119
3 Temp Norm 18.5 21.5 20 0.83
4 Temp Beta 17 20 1.58 1.55
5 Temp Norm 20.4 22 21.2 0.43
6 Temp Norm 18 22 20 0.99
7 Temp Gamma 18 23 256 0.081967213
8 Temp Beta 12 17 1.72 1.2
9 Temp Beta 17 22.5 2.09 1.53
10 Temp Norm 17 21 19 0.797
11 Temp Beta 13.5 23 2.45 2.06
12 Temp Beta 16 24 1.82 1.81
13 Temp Beta 15 25 2.13 1.57
14 Temp Beta 19.5 21 1.19 1.91
15 Temp Norm 17.1 23 20 1.46
16 Temp Norm 19 23 21 1.24
17 Temp Norm 15 24 19.7 2.63
18 Temp Norm 16 21 18.5 0.943
19 Temp Norm 18 20 19.1 0.618
20 Temp Gamma 17 22 188 0.10460251
21 Temp Norm 15 25 20 2.67
22 Temp Gamma 19.5 22.5 948 0.021645022
23 Temp Lognorm 13 25 2.91 0.179
24 Temp Beta 18 22 3.09 2.04
25 Temp Beta 17 21 2.28 1.42
1 calib Norm 25 150 95.8 38.5
2 calib Beta 100 400 2.04 1.99
3 calib Norm 20 500 246 125
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5 calib Lognorm 50 2000 5.99 0.95
6 calib Gamma 100 4000 1.7 917.4311927
7 calib Lognorm 100 300 5.23 0.22
8 calib Gamma 0 500 4.81 45.87155963
9 calib Lognorm 30 600 5.73 0.482
10 calib Beta 100 1000 0.78 0.827
11 calib Beta 650 1500 0.686 0.802
12 calib Beta 50 400 0.662 0.764
13 calib Beta 20 500 2.33 1.87
14 calib Beta 80 400 0.804 1.43
15 calib Lognorm 5 3000 5.57 0.896
16 calib Lognorm 200 10000 6.91 0.799
17 calib Beta 60 360 2.85 2.19
18 calib Beta 10 10000 1 1
19 calib Gamma 250 5000 3.19 704.2253521
20 calib Beta 0 600 1 1
21 calib Gamma 15 500 1.71 116.2790698
22 calib Beta 100 3000 1.07 0.907
23 calib Lognorm 100 400 5.28 0.357
24 calib Beta 100 300 0.985 0.551
25 calib Gamma 5 70 2.79 11.69590643References
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